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ABSTRACT
Wireless networks are a common place nowadays and almost all of the modern devices support wireless 
communication   in some form. These networks differ from more traditional computing systems due to 
the ad-hoc and spontaneous  nature of interactions  among devices. These systems are prone to security 
risks,  such as eavesdropping   and require different techniques as compared to traditional security 
mechanisms.  Recently,   secure   device   pairing   in   wireless   environments    has   got   substantial  
attention  from  many researchers.  As a result, a significant  set of techniques  and protocols  have been 
proposed  to deal with this   issue.   Some   of   these   techniques   consider   devices   equipped   with 
infrared,    laser,    ultrasound  transceivers   or 802.11 network interface cards; while others require 
embedded accelerometers,   cameras and/or  LEDs,  displays,   microphones  and/or   speakers.   However,  
many   of the  proposed   techniques   or  protocols have not been implemented at all; while others are 
implemented and evaluated in a stand-alone manner without being compared with other related work [1]. 
We believe that it is because of the lack of specialized  tools  that  provide  a common  platform  to test the  
pairing  methods.  As a consequence,  we designed such a tool. In this paper, we are presenting  design 
and development   of the Pairing Simulator  (PSim) that can be used to perform the analysis of device 
pairing methods.
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1. INTRODUCTION
More and more computing devices are coming into existence everyday, which may vary in size, 
capabilities, mode of interaction and so on. As a result, we are moving towards a world in which 
computing  is  omnipresent.   Most  of  the  modern  devices  support  multiple  communication 
channels  and  almost  all  of them  use wireless  technology  in some  form,  such  as Bluetooth, 
Infrared,  Wibree,  Zigbee,  Ultrasound  or 802.11 Having  wireless  technology  in these devices 
does not guarantee  that all of these  devices  can  also take advantage  of internet  technology. 
However,  those wireless  enabled  devices  that can not be connected  to internet,  can still take 
advantage  of  other  co-located  devices  in  the  vicinity  by  forming  short-term  or  long-term 
associations  on ad hoc basis. For example pairing a Bluetooth  enabled headset with a mobile 
phone or MP3 player (short-term) and pairing of a PDA with home devices in order to control 
them wirelessly (long-term).
Since wireless communication  is susceptible to eavesdropping,  thus one can easily launch well 
known  man-in-the-middle   (MITM)  attack,  Denial-of-Service   (DoS)  attack  or  can  perform 
bidding-down   attack  to  fail  the  secure  pairing  process.  The  solution  to  this  problem  is 
establishing a secure channel between the pairing devices by some kind of mechanisms, such as 
authentication  and encryption.  Establishing  a secure  channel  is trivial, when there existed  an 
off-line or on-line global infrastructure,  such as PKI. However, such a global infrastructure  is 
hard to implement  in mobile ad hoc and ubiquitous  computing  environments  that makes it a
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challenging real-world problem. Due to the  ad hoc and dynamic nature of  these environments, 
devices do not know each other a  priori, so the idea of pre-shared secret key is  failed. Further, 
traditional  key exchange  or key agreement  approaches,  such as Diffie-Hellman  [2]– in their 
actual form – are not applicable  in wireless environments  due to their vulnerability  to MiTM 
attack.  Moreover,  devices’  heterogeneity   in  terms  of  their  communication   channels,  user 
interfaces,  power requirements  and sensing technology,  make it hard to give a single solution 
for secure pairing of devices. As a result, wide community of researchers has proposed a large 
set of protocols  and techniques  to deal with this issue. However,  these protocols  vary in the 
strength  of their security,  their susceptibility  to environmental  conditions  and in the required 
physical capabilities of the devices. Currently, there may existed many options for an ordinary 
user to establish  a secure  channel  between  the devices  from entering  pins and passwords  to 
verifying hashes of public keys and pressing buttons simultaneously on the two devices. In this 
paper, we are presenting the design, development and evaluation of a simulation tool for pairing 
methods followed by a brief discussion on existing pairing methods.
Remaining  part of this paper is organized  as follows:  section  2 is background  that describes 
various existing device pairing methods, section 3 presents the design and development  of the 
simulator,  section  4 discusses  a case study that is carried  out to evaluate  the simulator,  and 
finally section 5 concludes the paper.
2. BACKGROUND
The problem of secure device association (pairing) continues to be a very active area of research 
in  wireless  environments.  The  issue  got  significant  attention  from  many  researchers,  after 
Stajano  et  al.  [3-4]  highlighted  the  challenges  inherent  in  secure  device  association.  They 
proposed   a  mother-duckling   (master-slave)   model,   which  maps  the  relationship   between 
devices. The pairing process is done by agreeing on a secret key over the physical connection 
(such as using a cable).  Though  the secret  key is transferred  in plain-text  and cryptographic 
methods are not used, it is susceptible to dictionary attacks. In reality, it is also difficult to have 
common physical interfaces in both of the devices, and carrying cables all of the time might not 
be possible for owners of the devices. Balfanz et al. [5] extended Stanjano and Anderson’s work 
and proposed a two-phase authentication method for pairing of co-located devices using infrared 
as a location limited side channel. In their proposed solution, pre-authentication  information is 
exchanged  over  the  infrared  channel  and  then  the  user  switches  to  the  common  wireless 
channel. Slightly different variations of Balfanz et al [5] approach are proposed in [6-9], which 
also  use  location  limited  side  channel  to  transfer  the  pre-authentication  data.  The  common 
problem with these approaches  is twofold: first, they need some kind of interface  (e.g. IrDA, 
laser, ultrasound, etc) for pre-authentication  phase and are vulnerable to passive eavesdropping 
attack  in the location  limited  side channels,  e.g. two remotes  and one projector.  Some other 
pairing  schemes  including  Bluetooth  require  the  human  operator  to  put  the  communicating 
partners into discovery mode. After discovery and selection of a device, the channel is secured 
by entering the same PIN or password into both devices. Although it is a general approach, it 
gives rise to a number of usability and security issues [10, 11]. For example, a short password or 
PIN  number  makes  it  vulnerable   to  dictionary  or  exhaustive   search  attacks.  Further,  in 
Bluetooth pairing an adversary can eavesdrop to break the security from a  long distance using 
powerful antennas.
Based on the pairing protocol of Balfanz et al. [5], some other schemes are proposed through 
the use of audio and visual out-of-band channels. One such system is Seeing-is-Believing  (SiB) 
[12]. SiB uses two dimensional  bar codes for exchanging  pre-authentication  data between the 
devices.  In  the  proposed  approach,  device  A  encodes  cryptographic  material  into  a  two- 
dimensional  barcode and displays it on the screen, then device B reads it through a camera to 
setup an authenticated  channel. To reduce the camera requirement in one of the pairing device
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in  SiB,  Saxena  et  al.  [13]  extended  the  work  of  McCune  et  al.  [12]  and  proposed  an 
improvement to it through the use of simple light source, such as LEDs, and short authenticated 
integrity checksums. In the proposed scheme, device A needs to be equipped with a camera and 
device B with a single LED. When the LED on device B blinks, device A takes a video clip. 
Then, video clip is parsed to extract an authentication  string.   Loud and Clear (L&C) [14] and 
Human-Assisted  Pure  Audio  Device  Pairing  (HAPADEP)  [15]  use audio  as an out-of-band 
channel to securely pair the devices. The main idea of L&C [14] scheme is to encode the hash 
of first device’s public key into a MadLib sentence (i.e. grammatically  correct but nonsensical 
sentence)  and transmit it over a device-to-human  channel using a speaker or a display. Then, 
second  device  also  encodes  the  hash  of  the  received  public  key  from  first  device  into  the 
MadLib sentence and transmit it over a device-to-human  channel using a speaker or a display. 
Then user is responsible to compare the two sentences and to accept or reject the pairing. There 
are two variants  of this approach:  speaker-to-speaker  and display-to-speaker.  In first method 
user is required  to compare  and verify the two sentences  vocalized  by the pairing candidate 
devices. In the second method, user is required to compare the displayed MadLib sentence on 
one  device  with  the  vocalized  MadLib  sentence  from  the  other  device.  Finally,  user  is 
responsible  for  accepting  or  rejecting  the  pairing  based  on  the  results  of  comparison.  In 
HAPADEP  [15],  Soriente  et  al.  consider  the  problem  of  pairing  two  devices  that  have  no 
common  wireless  communication  channel,  such as Bluetooth  or WiFi, at the time of pairing. 
The proposed scheme uses pure audio to exchange both public keys and hashes of public keys. 
The  pairing  schemes  that  use  audio  and/or  visual  out  of  band  channels  [12-14]  are  also 
inapplicable  in some  of the scenarios.  For example,  SiB [12] requires  that  devices  must  be 
equipped with camera; while in L&C [14] a speaker and/or display is required, and HAPADEP 
[15] is applicable  in those  scenarios  where  both devices  have  a microphone  and  a speaker. 
Camera equipped  devices are usually prohibited  in high security areas; while the latter is not 
suitable for hearing-impaired  users. Further, bar code scanning requires sufficient proximity and 
light in SiB; while L&C and HAPADEP  places some burden  on the user for comparison  of 
audible sequences. An adversary can easily subvert bar code stickers on  devices in SiB; while 
ambient noise makes authentication  either weak or difficult in L&C as well as in HAPADEP. 
While [13] is a variation of SiB, so this scheme has few of the same limitations as SiB, such as 
requiring close proximity and a camera in at least one of the device.
Unlike previously described approaches,  the idea of shaking devices together to pair them has 
become more common.  Smart-its-Friends  [16] is the first effort that proposed  pairing of two 
devices using a common movement pattern and used accelerometers  as an out-of-band channel. 
In this approach,  two  devices  are held  and  shaken  together  simultaneously.  Then,  common 
readings from the embedded accelerometers in the devices are exploited to  establish the 
communication  channel  between  the two devices.  However,  security  has not been the major 
concern of Smart-its-Friends.  The follow-on method to Smart-its-Friends  is Shake Well Before 
Use [17]. Mayrhofer and Gellersen extended the Holmquist et al. [16] approach and proposed 
two  protocols   to  securely   pair  the  devices.   Both  of  the  proposed  protocols  exploit  the 
cryptographic primitives with accelerometer data analysis for  secure device-to-device 
authentication.  First protocol uses public key cryptography  and is more secure as compared to 
the   second   protocol,   which   is  more   efficient   and   computes   secret   key   directly   from 
accelerometer’s data. Another approach that requires shaking or moving patterns is Shake Them 
Up [18]. Authors suggest a  manual technique for pairing two resource-constrained  devices that 
involves  shaking  and twirling  them in very close proximity  to each other.  Unlike  Smart-its- 
Friends and Shake Well Before Use, this approach exploits the source indinguishability property 
of  radio  signals  and  does  not  require  embedded  accelerometers.   While  being  shaken,  two 
devices exchange radio packets and agree on a key one bit at a time, relying on the adversary’s 
inability to determine the source of radio packet (sending device). Secure pairing of devices by 
shaking devices together is  an interesting approach. However, these schemes require 2D 
accelerometers  in both of the devices. Further, shaking devices together is always not possible,
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since there is large variety of devices, such as printers, projectors and laptops that can not be 
hold and shaken together simultaneously.  While Shake Them Up is susceptible to attack by an 
eavesdropper that exploits the differences in the baseband frequencies of the two radio sources. 
Recently,  Varshavsky  et al. [19] proposed – Amigo – a proximity-based  technique for secure 
pairing of co-located devices. Authors extended Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol with the 
addition  of key verification  stage. The proposed  approach  exploits the common  radio signals 
from  locally  available  wireless  access  points  to  establish  the  secure  channel  between  the 
devices. Since, AMIGO uses the common radio signals from the located access points; it is not 
applicable in the scenarios, where the radio data is not available to process or where the wireless 
network is easy to eavesdrop  on while remaining  hidden. It is also a fact that in many under 
developing   countries   802.11-based   wireless   technology   is  less  popular   as  compared   to 
Bluetooth technology that is more popular and common due to the mobile phones.
Some other efforts towards secure device pairing include Button-Enabled  Device Association 
(BEDA) [20], LoKey [21], Are You With Me? [22] and Malkani et al.’s work [23, 24]. BEDA 
is proposed  by Soriente et al., and it has four variants. The main idea is to transfer the short 
secret  key  from  one  device  to  the  other  using  ‘button-presses’   and  then  use  that  key  to 
authenticate  the public keys of the devices.  Short secret key is agreed upon between the two 
devices  via one of the four  variants  of BEDA.   These  are called  button-to-button  (B-to-B), 
display-to-button  (D-to-B),  short  vibration-to-button  (SV-to-B)  and  long  vibration-to-button 
(LV-to-B).  The first and basic variant (i.e. B-to-B) involves  the user simultaneously  pressing 
buttons on both of the devices within certain random time-intervals  and each of these intervals 
are used to derive 3-bits of the short secret key.  LoKey uses SMS messages to authenticate key 
exchanged over the internet. However, this approach incurs substantial monetary cost and delay. 
While, Are You With Me? again requires accelerometers  and is not applicable in the scenarios 
as Shake Well Before Use or Smart-its-Friends.  Malkani et al. [23, 24] have proposed a generic 
framework  for secure  device  association.  In the proposed  system  devices  first  register  their 
capabilities   with  the  directory   service.   Then,  whenever   two  devices   need  to  create   an 
association,  the  client  (device  A)  queries  the  directory  service  to  discover  and  acquire  the 
required information to initiate a secure pairing with the target device (device B). Based on the 
information from directory service, both the client (device A) and resource (device B) mutually 
execute  a  common  pairing  protocol.  This  protocol  involves  the  generation  of  a  key  from 
interaction with the environment.  The selected interactions generate an appropriate key for the 
nature  of the  intended  association,  and  a successful  pairing  arises  when  matching  keys  are 
generated on both of the devices.
In summary, there is an immense literature on secure device association. However, some of the 
proposed techniques or protocols are not implemented at all; while others are implemented and 
evaluated  in a stand-alone  manner  without  being  compared  with other  related  work  [1, 25]. 
Examples of these include Resurrecting Duckling Security Model [4], Talking to Strangers [5], 
AMIGO [19], Shake Well Before Use [17], some of the Saxena et al.’s proposed methods [26] 
and  four  variants  of BEDA  [20]  approach.  Since  the motivation  for this work  is   [25]  that 
presents  state-of-the-art  in the area of secure device pairing along with some future research 
directions, therefore, one can refer it for further details.
3. DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
An  extensive   set  of  comparative   usability  tests  can  play  a  vital  role  in  the  process  of 
standardizing  pairing methods. However, conducting  such a detailed case study is not an easy 
task due to several reasons. For example, it is very tedious and laborious job to implement all of 
the  existing  (more  than  two  dozens)  pairing  methods  using  a  common  platform.  Even  it 
becomes  more  difficult  when  implementing  network  functionality  since  these  schemes  use 
numerous wireless channels, such as Bluetooth, WiFi, Ultrasound, Infrared, etc. We believe that
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our  designed   simulator   reduces  the  development   and  implementation   efforts  for  pairing 
protocols and makes it easy to conduct several usability tests to evaluate them.
Figure 1: Screen shot of the simulator showing simulated devices (Alice and Bob)
Figure 2: Screen shot of the simulator showing some of the test results
Figure 1 and figure 2 shows the screen shots of the simulator. Our simulator supports automated 
test  sessions,  automatic  test  data  collection,  logging  errors,  and  also  facilitates  to  simulate 
several attack scenarios, such as MiTM.  Test organizer/developer  does not need to develop new 
device  interfaces  for  pairing  methods  each  time,  since  the  simulator  supports  simulation  of 
devices having combinations of eight installed capabilities. Therefore, existing and new pairing 
methods  can easily be implemented  and tested with minimum  development  efforts.  Figure  1 
illustrates  a typical test session, while figure 2 illustrates  how does test organizer  can see the 
results at the end of the test without taking any extra efforts. The designed simulator is capable 
of showing final results in tabular as well as in graphical/charts  form. We have used java to 
write the code of simulator. Eclipse is used as an IDE. Some of the third party libraries used in
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the  development  of  this  simulator  include  Bouncy  Castle  Cryptographic   library  [27]  and 
Chart2D library [28]. Bouncy Castle is a lightweight  collection of APIs used in cryptography. 
These APIs can work with J2ME, J2SE and there are also APIs for C# programming language. 
While Chart2D is a Java class library for drawing 2D charts or graphs. Some of the features of 
the designed simulator are summarized below:
1. Simulator can be  used either locally running on one computer, or remotely running on two 
different computers (i.e. one for Alice and other for Bob)
2. It facilitates  logging  of test  date  and  time,  pairing  method’s  parameters  (such  as pairing 
scheme name, total pairing time, false –ves, false +ves), and devices’ capabilities information.
3. It is capable of auto-generating results in tabular form as well as in charts or graphical form.
5. It also provides the entire test log information as a raw-result-set in form of a text file.
5. It facilitates  the test organizers  to create and store the batch of test-scenarios  prior to the 
experiment/tests.
6.  Currently it has support for Bluetooth and 802.11 networks.
4. EVALUATION OF SIMULATOR
We  conducted  a  case  study  of  some  of  the  existing  pairing  methods  using  the  designed 
simulator for evaluation purposes. Results of the study have proved to be positive. The objective 
of the study was to evaluate the usability of four pairing methods as well as the simulator itself. 
These  four  methods  are  Button-to-Button,   Display-to-Button,   LED-to-Button  and  Beep-to- 
Button.  First  two  methods  are  described  in  [20],  while  other  two  are  variations  of  second 
method (i.e. Display-to-Button).  A brief description of each of the implemented method is given 
below.
(i) Button-to-Button (B-to-B)
In this method user is required to press and release the button on both of the devices (i.e. device 
A and device B) simultaneously  with random time-intervals.  Both of the simulated devices are 
programmed  to  start  a  timer  with  the  first  button  press.  Then,  the  elapsed  time  between 
subsequent button-presses is exploited to calculate the key. From each time-interval 3-bits of the 
secret are generated.
(ii) Display-to-Button (D-to-B)
In this method target device (device B) selects a key, encode and transmit it through random 
flashes of the display. Whenever the display of device B flashes user is required to press and 
release button on device A.  Likewise previous approach, the elapsed time between each button- 
press is used to calculate the bits of shared key on device A.
(iii) LED-to-Button (LED-to-B)
This scheme is similar to Display-to-Button  approach. The only difference is that instead of a 
display,  an LED is used to transmit  the bits of shared  secret.  This scheme  is suitable  in the 
situations where one of the devices has only a button and the other has only a single LED (e.g. 
wireless  access  point).  This  scheme  works  in the same  way  as the previous  one.  Device  B 
chooses a key and transmits it through LED-blinks with random time-intervals.  To obtain same
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shared  secret  on  device  A,  user  is  responsible  to  press  and  release  button  on  the  device 
whenever an LED blinks on device B.
(iv) Beep-to-Button (Beep-to-B)
This scheme is also a variation of Display-to-Button  method. In this scheme, device B selects a 
key and transmits it through random beeps. User is required to press and release button on first 
device whenever he/she hears a beep sound from the other device. This method is useful in the 
scenarios where first device has only a single button and the other device has only a speaker.
4.1. Test Procedure
A total of 15 volunteers were recruited. All of the participants were chosen on first-come first- 
serve basis. All of the participants are students and most of them are PhD students. They all are 
good computer users. The background profile information of the participants is summarized in 
table 1.
Table 1. Test Participants Profile Information
Gender Male: 86.66%
Female: 13.33%
Age 25 – 30: 40%
31 – 36: 40%
37 – 42: 20%
Last academic qualification achieved Bachelor: 26.66%
Masters 73.33%
Having experience of pairing two devices Yes: 93.33% 
No:  6.33%
The  tests  were  conducted   in  two  environments;   a  lab-based   environment   using  desktop 
computers,  running  Windows  XP  operating  system,  and  a  home-based  environment  using 
laptops, running Windows Vista operating system. Before the start of each experiment, we have 
explained briefly the goals of the experiment along with the description of each pairing method 
to the participant.  Then, a pre-test questionnaire  is filled by the participant  before starting the 
test cases.
Each experiment consists of three parts. In first part, three methods LED-to-Button, Display-to- 
Button and Beep-to-Button  are tested. Since, the simulator facilitates to generate and store the 
batch of test scenarios that can be executed later on demand; so, we created a batch of six tests 
scenarios (two for each method) a priori. This facilitates each participant  to perform all of the 
six tests in one-go without any interruption.  In second part of the experiment,  each participant 
performed  two repetitions  of Button-to-Button  method. Left-button  of the mouse is used as a 
button of the simulated device. Participant is required to click on ‘Push-Button’ simultaneously 
with random time-intervals  on both of the simulated devices. This test requires two machines, 
one  for  simulating  Alice  (button-capable  device  A)  and  other  for  simulating  Bob  (button- 
capable device B). In third part, we asked the user to build any of the preferred method using the 
simulator and execute it. It gave the user an opportunity to examine the usability of the designed 
simulator. Finally, at the end of experiment every participant filled a post-test questionnaire that 
contains questions regarding the usability (from very easy to not usable at all) of each of the 
method and the simulator.
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4.2. Results and Discussion
Table 2. Results generated by the simulator based on logged data
Figure 3: Mean and standard deviation (sd) of pairing time
Results presented in this section are obtained from the collected data by means of questionnaire 
and as well as by the generated log file of the simulator. Table 2 above shows the results that are 
auto-generated by the simulator. The graphs shown in figures 3 and 4 are also auto-generated by 
the simulator using logged data. Other graphs shown in figures 5, 6 and 7 are drawn from the 
data obtained through post-test questionnaire. Microsoft Excel is used to draw these graphs.
Figure 4: False negatives (safe error) rate of pairing methods
According to the graph shown in figure-3, using a button on both devices is faster than all of the 
other schemes. Figure 4 shows that B-to-B has the minimum number of false negatives, while
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LED-to-B  has the maximum  number  of false negatives.  Figure  5 shows that majority  of the 
participants considered B-to-B and D-to-B methods very easy to use; while none considered B- 
to-B method as hard to use. Figure 6 shows that most of the users preferred B-to-B and D-to-B 
methods over LED-to-B and Beep-to-B  methods in the case if their devices support all of the 
four methods. Graph in figure 7 presents the evaluation results for the designed simulator itself.
33% users considered  it very easy to use; while 67% considered it as easy to use and none of 
them considered it as  hard, very hard or not usable at all. These results show that the designed 
simulator is applicable  for testing usability of pairing methods from both developer and users 
point of view. Since the data presented in table 2  and graphs shown in figures 3 – 7  are self- 
explanatory,  so instead of describing  them in more detail, we would like to discuss how this 
simulator  can  be helpful  in the  research  of  generalizing  or  standardizing  the  secure  device 
pairing mechanism.
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Figure 5: Participants response for the usability of pairing methods
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Figure 7: Level of difficulty in using the simulator
As motivation,  let’s consider a device pairing scenario where device A is only button-capable 
and device  B has display,  LED and as well as a speaker.  Note that in this scenario  we are 
considering only the four pairing methods along with results obtained as a consequence of our 
case study. So, in the scenario possible pairing methods are Display-to-Button,  LED-to-Button 
and Beep-to-Button.  The questions is how does user (or a system such as [24]) decide the best 
pairing scheme among three of these possible methods. In this and other similar situations, user 
or system needs to have the knowledge of priority-level (or some specific measures) of each of 
the candidate  method, so that the best possible pairing method can be selected.  This priority- 
level  can  be set  based  on the level  of security  provided  by the method  and  as well  as the 
usability of that method. We believe that the results of this and other more detailed usability 
studies using the designed simulator can be helpful to prioritize or set weights for each of the 
pairing method based on their usability and the level of provided security. For example, based 
on the  obtained  results  of our  case  study,  Display-to-Button  has  the  highest  priority  in the 
scenario  presented  above.  So, user/system  should  select  this protocol  to initiate  the pairing. 
Further, this simulator can be helpful to rapidly implement and test a large set of pairing 
schemes  in order to specify certain common or standard measures for up-coming pairing 
protocols.
5. CONCLUSIONS
There has been done an immense work in the field of secure device pairing from both academic 
research  and industrial  research  points of view. However,  no one has yet devised the perfect 
pairing scheme that could be feasible for all kind of or large set of scenarios. Pairing schemes 
vary in the strength of their security, the level of required user intervention, their susceptibility 
to environmental  conditions and in the required physical capabilities  of the devices as well as 
the   required   proximity   between   the   devices. So,   we   still   need   other   mechanisms, 
infrastructures,  tools and techniques  that integrate several pairing techniques  within a general 
architecture  for providing secure as well as usable pairing mechanisms  (such as [24]). One of 
the reasons  for lack of a general,  standardized  or universal  pairing mechanism  is an uneven 
comparative evaluation of the several existing methods. It  might be because of unavailability of 
specialized  tools  that  provide  a  common  platform  to  test  the  usability  or  security  of  these 
methods against some common set of measures. This creates the need to design new tools, such 
as simulators,  benchmarks  and usability  testing frameworks,  that can be used to evaluate  the 
existing  as  well  as  new  pairing  schemes  [25].  This  motivated  us  towards  the  design  and 
development  of the  pairing  simulator.  Our  designed  simulator  is capable  of generating  and 
saving test scenarios a priori, logging test information and generating textual, tabular as well as
graphical results from the logged data at the completion of each test case. We believe that it will 
be very helpful for both the researchers and other less technical persons working in the area of 
device pairing to rapidly implement  and test new pairing protocols without  writing extensive 
piece of code.
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